Abstract. In this paper we study two possible approaches to improving existing schemes for constructing hash functions that hash arbitrary long messages. First, we introduce a continuum of function classes that lie between universal one-way hash functions and collision-resistant functions. For some of these classes efficient (yielding short keys) composite schemes exist. Second, we prove that the schedule of the Shoup construction, which is the most efficient composition scheme for universal one-way hash functions known so far, is optimal.
Introduction
In the pursuit of efficient and provably secure constructions of practical cryptosystems several basic primitives have emerged as useful building blocks. Two of them are collision-resistant hash functions (CRHFs) and universal one-way hash functions (UOWHFs). In the complexity-theoretic sense UOWHF is a strictly weaker primitive than CRHF, because the latter is also the former but there is an oracle relative to which UOWHFs exist but not CRHFs [?] . Therefore it might be reasonable to base practical cryptosystems on a weaker primitive, which can be easier to construct. Also, since no unconditionally secure UOWHFs are known, the assumption that a particular family of functions is a UOWHF can be more plausible than the assumption of its collision-resistance.
A UOWHF is a collection of keyed compressing functions {h k } k∈K such that winning the following game is infeasible: The adversary chooses x, then receives a key k ∈ K picked at random and wins if he can find y such that h k (x) = h k (y).
A CRHF is a set of keyed compressing functions {f k } k∈K such that for a random k ∈ K it is infeasible to find x and y that satisfy f k (x) = f k (y).
In many applications it is convenient to have a family of UOWHFs or CRHFs, i.e., a collection of functions that map bit strings of different lengths into fixed length strings. The problem is to construct such a family given a single UOWHF or CRHF, which is typically the case when one begins with an off-the-shelf function, for instance, MD5 or SHA-1. For CRHFs a widely used, provably secure and efficient method is the Merkle-Damgård construction [?,?] . Surprisingly, this construction does not apply to UOWHFs ([?] gave a concrete example of a UOWHF on which the Merkle-Damgård construction fails). For building UOWHF families the best method known so far is due to Shoup [?] .
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In this paper we study applicability of the Merkle-Damgård construction, introducing a continuum of primitives that lie between CRHF and UOWHF. Then we give an alternative proof of the Shoup construction and prove that this construction is optimal in some restricted model of computations. The optimality result is the major contribution of the paper.
Motivation: Key length of different composition schemes
The first application of UOWHFs in [?] was to use them as a tool for constructing a signature scheme secure under the most general attack. However, most practical signature schemes that follow "hash-and-sign" paradigm use UOWHFs or CRHFs in a different way. They take a message M of an arbitrary length and hash it to obtain a constant length string, which is then fed into a signing algorithm. Many schemes use CRHF families to hash M , but as it was first noted in [?] a UOWHF suffices for that purpose. Indeed, if {h k } k∈K is a UOWHF, then (k, h k (M )), where k chosen at random, can be signed and still be as secure as the underlying signature algorithm. If the key length varies with the length of a message, the signing algorithm is applied to (
where K is part of the signer's public key. Here function h K can be replaced by any second-preimage resistant function, because its input is random and chosen by the signer. Since messages can be very long, hashing speed is a crucial factor. Again, because a UOWHF is a weaker primitive than a CRHF, we may hope to find a more efficient algorithm that implements a UOWHF, thus speeding up the signature scheme.
A closer look at this approach reveals that the key k must be part of the signature so the receiver can recompute the hash. Therefore the shorter the key the better. This is our motivation for studying different composition schemes that yield hash functions with a short key.
The problem of composing a family of UOWHFs does not exist in case of CRHFs, since the Merkle-Damgård construction does not increase the key size. Ironically, if we consider two competing algorithms one implementing a CRHF and a more efficient one, which is supposedly a UOWHF, a signature scheme based on the CRHF can outperform a scheme that uses a family of UOWHFs.
Among several composition schemes for UOWHFs [?,?] the one with the smallest key expansion is due to Shoup [?] . Characteristics of the Shoup construction are the following. Suppose that the starting point is a UOWHF that has key length l and compresses n bits to m bits. The composition scheme yields a family of UOWHFs such that a function that compresses N bits to m bits is keyed by m · log 2 N/(n − m) + l bits. The key length grows logarithmically with the length of a message. Schemes in [?,?] have the same asymptotics but a bigger constant factor.
In Table ? ? we give a concrete example of the signature length on messages of various sizes if we couple 1024-bit modulus RSA with either a CRHF or a UOWHF. The UOWHF as in [?] results from the Shoup construction applied to a keyed SHA-1 compression function, which hashes 672 bits to 160 bits. 
Definitions
CRHFs and UOWHFs enjoy different types of collision-resistance and their constructions base on different assumptions. This adds to the impression that these two primitives have nothing in common. In fact, the only difference between them is in the degree of freedom that the adversary has in choosing one of the colliding elements. In case of a UOWHF, the adversary commits to x before he knows the key, while to defeat a CRHF the adversary is free to choose x afterwards. This difference can be easily quantified by specifying how many bits of x the adversary commits to before he knows the key. Qualitative differences between several variations of hash functions were demonstrated in [?] . We shall see that the Merkle-Damgård construction may be extended to a class of functions that lie between CRHF and UOWHF.
} i∈N be a sequence of non-repeating triplets of integer numbers such that 0 < m i < n i and 0 ≤ i ≤ n i for any i. We say that a collection of keyed functions h
if no adversary can win the following game for infinitely many i in time poly(n i ) with probability at least 1/poly(n i ):
1. The adversary selects some 
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We call the i bits that the adversary is free to choose the flexibility of a class.
This definition subsumes the definitions of UOWHFs and CRHFs. The class of functions with zero flexibility, CR 0 (n i → m i ), is the class of UOWHFs, where the adversary must choose in its entirety one of the colliding elements before he knows the key. On the other hand, functions with full flexibility, CR n i (n i → m i ), constitute the class of CRHFs, since the adversary commits to nothing ahead of time.
We may omit the index parameter i for the sake of notation brevity. It does not imply that we consider a single triple (n, m, ) (our asymptotic definition is inept in this setting), but that the subsequent arguments can be uniformly applied to the whole family of {(n i , m i , i )} i∈N . For example, we can formulate and prove the following propositions without utilizing the index variable.
Proof. Because higher flexibility gives more power to the adversary, any set of functions that qualifies as CR 1 (n → m) also belongs to CR 2 (n → m).
Proposition 2. A collision for a function from CR (n → m) can be found in
Proof. Consider the birthday attack that applies to the flexible part of the input. 
Merkle-Damgård Construction Applies to CR (n → m),
PSfrag replacements This is the usual Merkle-Damgård construction except that the initializing value (IV) is also part of the input. The following theorem proves that the construction works correctly on functions from the class CR (n → m), where ≥ m.
Theorem 1. Suppose we have a family of functions {h
Proof. Suppose that i = m i . The case of i > m i is treated analogously. Assume for contradiction that there is an algorithm A that wins the game described in Definition ?? for infinitely many i. We build an algorithm B that contradicts the fact that {h
. Fix some i. Denote the value A commits to on the first step of this game by x = (x 1 , . . . , x r ). Choose 0 < j ≤ r i at random. Commit to x j in the game played by B.
Key k is chosen at random. Let A find x 0 and y = (y 0 , y 1 , . . . , y r ) that make a collision. Now
. With probability at least 1/r we have a collision on the j th application of the function h
where C j and C j are the chaining variables. If it is the case, B outputs a colliding pair C j−1 ||x j and C j−1 ||y j .
The fact that i ≥ m i is crucial for the proof. Because the flexible part of the hashes' input is longer than their output, the adversary does not need to commit to the chaining variable if he wants to use A to find a collision. The value of the chaining variable depends on the key and cannot be predicted ahead of time. It is where the proof breaks if we want to apply it to the case when i < m i .
Note 1. In practice we want to have a CRHF or a UOWHF that takes as input any string of some bounded length and maps it to a fixed-length string. This is stronger primitive than a collection of functions each taking a fixed-length input, because it must be collision resistant (resp. be a UOWHF) across inputs of different length. It turns out that a collection of fixed-input length functions can be strengthened to allow a variable input length. We assume that the message is padded to a length divisible by the block size (n − m in case of the MerkleDamgård construction) and the last block of the message uniquely encodes the message length before padding. This preprocessing stage was proposed in [?] and discussed in [?] along with a definition of a free-start attack. Theorem ?? can be generalized to hold for this strengthened construction ([?] proved the theorem for families of pure CRHFs and UOWHFs).
Boundary
Because there is a complexity-theoretic jump between CRHFs and UOWHFs, we may expect to observe at least one such a jump in the sequence of classes CR 0 (n → m) ⊇ · · · ⊇ CR n (n → m). The following theorems show that this is indeed the case and there are two classes of complexity-theoretic equivalence. The boundary between them coincides with the limit of validity of the MerkleDamgård construction (Section ??).
We recall that UOWHFs are one-way functions and can be built from a family of one-way functions [?] proved that there is no black-box (relativizing) construction of a CRHF based on a UOWHF. In our terminology it means that there is no unconditional construction of CR n (n → m) given access to CR 0 (n → m) as a black-box.
Theorem 2. CR m−O(log n) (n → m) is non-empty if and only if CRHFs exist.
Proof. The adversary playing the game from Definition ?? may choose values for O(log n) bits randomly. His probability of success drops in this case by a factor of 2 O(log n) = poly(n). Therefore CR m−O(log n) (n → m) = CR m (n → m).
Since CR m (n → m) ⊇ CR n (n → m) by Proposition ??, the "if" part is trivial.
Suppose we have a {h
m for any k ∈ K as follows. Suppose that g k takes two arguments-a single bit b and x, which is m-bit long. Let
We claim that {g k } k∈K ∈ CR m+1 (m + 1 → m), i.e., it is a CRHF family.
Assume the opposite. There is an efficient algorithm A that for a random k finds a collision g k (b 0 , x) = g k (b 1 , y) . Wlog we may assume that b 0 = 0 with probability at least 1/2. We want to show that {h k } k∈K / ∈ CR m (n → m). In order to prove it we build algorithm B that wins the game from Definition ?? as follows: ) as a collision for h k .
The output of B is indeed a collision, since
and, because b 0 ||x = b 1 ||y, these two elements of the domain of h k are different. The success probability of B is at least one half of the success probability of A. Notice that g k (0, x) and g k (1, x) is a pair of claw-free pseudo-injections (see [?] ).
Theorem 3. CR m−m Ω(1) (n → m) is not empty if and only if UOWHFs exist. Formally, if some CR i (n i → m i ) is not empty, then UOWHFs exist. If UOWHFs exist, then for any
Proof. Since CR 0 (n → m) ⊇ CR (n → m), the "only if" part is trivial.
Suppose UOWHFs exist. Take {h k } k∈K ∈ CR 0 (n → m). Then for any < poly(n) we may define g k : {0, 1} n+ → {0, 1} m+ as
where |y| = and |x| = n. We claim that {g k } k∈K ∈ CR (n + → m + ). Indeed, if there is a collision g k (x 0 , y 0 ) = g k (x 1 , y 1 ), then y 0 = y 1 and h k (x 0 ) = h k (x 1 ). Note that y 0 is the flexible part of the input and x 0 is the part that the adversary commits to before he knows the key. The adversary works poly-time in n + . Since < poly(n), the adversary's running time is also polynomial in n. Therefore the same adversary can be used to break UOWHFness property of {h k } k∈K .
Suppose we are given a family of UOWHFs {h 
CRFs WUFs
WUFs2 oracle
CRFs2
PSfrag replacements Note 2. The claim of Theorem ?? can be improved if we assume that n < poly(m) and CR 0 (n → m) has "ideal" security Ω(2 m ) as in Proposition ??. With these assumptions there is no gap between the two theorems and there are only two classes of equivalence.
Optimality of the Shoup Construction
[?] gave an example of a UOWHF on which the two-round Merkle-Damgård construction fails. Since we want to build UOWHFs the same way we build families of CRHFs, i.e., starting with a keyed function that has fixed-length input, other constructions have to be studied. The most efficient among different composition schemes that have appeared in the literature is the Shoup construction. We give an alternative proof of its correctness, which is technically simpler than in [?] and conceptually better matches our main result, the proof of its optimality.
Shoup Construction
The Shoup construction (see Figure ? ?) can be viewed as an extended MerkleDamgård construction, where the chaining variable is XORed with some mask on each iteration. Because these masks are reused, the key length grows logarithmically with the size of the message.
PSfrag replacements 
, where the auxiliary function ν(i) is the highest power of 2 that divides i.
Output of the function
We defer the proof of correctness of this construction to Section ??.
Optimality of the Shoup Construction
The Shoup construction achieves its short, compared to other constructions, key length of the composite scheme by reusing the bit-masks. A legitimate question is whether the masks can be reused even more. In this section we give a negative answer to this question. We prove that the Shoup construction really reuses masks as much as possible in the strongest sense. Proof. The proof consists of two steps. First, we show that any schedule of a valid construction must be even-free (defined below). Second, we prove that any schedule with r ≥ 2 L is not even-free.
Definition 3 (even-freeness property). We say that a schedule ν is evenfree if for any a and b, such that 1 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ r, there is some 0 ≤ η < L, such that the number of times ν(c) takes value η for a ≤ c ≤ b is odd. In other words, there is no sub-interval that contains every mask an even number of times.
Lemma 1. Any valid schedule ν is even-free.
Proof. Suppose there is a non even-free schedule ν of some valid r-round generalized Shoup construction. We build a UOWHF family on which this construction fails, thus contradicting validity of the construction. Assume that g k : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m is a UOWHF, 2m + 2 < n and k ∈ K = {0, 1} m . Of course, if UOWHFs do not exist, then every construction is valid but the problem itself is moot. If we have some UOWHF family, by adding an additional argument to its input that gets replicated to the output we can ensure that 2m + 2 < n. The size of the key space can be adjusted similarly. We define function h k : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} 2m+1 as follows:
where |y| = |z| = |k| = m, b is a bit and |x| = l = n − 2m − 1 > 1. As usual, we omit the index i of the family of UOWHFs, assuming that the construction of h k and the proof below apply uniformly to all functions of the family. We claim that h k is a UOWHF. Indeed, a collision h k (y, z, x) = h k (y , z , x ) also yields a collision g k (y, z, x) = g k (y , z , x ) unless z = k and z = k. Probability that the adversary hits z = k before he knows k is negligible.
If ν is not even-free, there is a sub-interval [a, b] that contains each mask an even number of times. We exploit this property to find a collision with a previously committed value.
Since the algorithm never stops without yielding a result, there is a mapping from the set of these strings into the set of possible outputs, which has the same cardinality. This mapping is an injection, because a preimage of an output value can be uniquely determined (it suffices to compute S j (x) for all corresponding j given M, k and x, which is trivial). Therefore, if the "decisions" are uniformly distributed, so are the outputs of the algorithm.
Shoup proved the security of the construction above. Our proof makes the key reconstruction algorithm more explicit and one-pass, thus giving a more efficient reduction, and requires less from the function ν (we do not need Fact 2 in [?]). The operation performed by the key reconstruction algorithm in step ??
is the only mask that appears an odd number of times between M ν(j) and its previous appearance (if there exists one) at
We stress that our result of optimality of the Shoup scheduling does not rule out existence of a composite scheme with a shorter key. Even more important, our result implies that there must be at least 1+ log r different masks, but says nothing about their independence. However, the proof of validity of the Shoup construction does need full independence of masks. There is an apparent gap between these two proofs.
We may try to reduce the key length by letting the masks be the output of a pseudo-random generator initialized with a short seed. Unfortunately, once the seed is exposed we cannot suppose anything about the output of the generator unless we resort to the random-oracle model. But in this model one could assume existence of CRHFs in the first place and our construction would be of no use in this world.
Conclusion and Open Problem
Recent attacks on MD4, MD5 and a flaw in the first version of SHA demonstrate that practical CRHFs are hard to construct. The oracle separation result due to [?] backed up this empirical fact by proving that CRHFs cannot be constructed from one-way permutations. Though UOWHFs, an alternative to CRHFs, have been known for years, their deployment in practical cryptosystems was hindered by lack of efficient composite schemes. While a family of CRHFs can be based on a single compression function, similar constructions for UOWHFs can only yield families of functions with variable key length. A variable key-length hash function stands out from all cryptographic primitives we use in practice and this annoying property can propagate to higher levels of construction (see [?] for an example).
We may approach this problem from two directions. First, it is possible that there exists a class of functions that are weaker than CRHFs, at least as strong as UOWHFs and for which an efficient composite scheme exists. We introduce a continuum of function classes that lie between CRHFs and UOWHFs and characterized by the degree of freedom the adversary has in choosing one of the colliding elements. From the complexity-theoretic point of view the hierarchy almost collapses to two large classes. The Merkle-Damgård construction, which yields fixed length-key families of functions, applies to one class of functions and not to the other.
Another approach is to improve existing composite schemes for UOWHFs. We take the Shoup construction, which is the most efficient (key length-wise), and prove that the scheme is optimal in respect to its mask scheduling. We also give a simplified proof of the Shoup construction.
An open problem is whether there exists a lower bound on the key length of a family of UOWHFs built via a black-box construction out of one-way functions. 
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